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STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION 
Utah Code Ann. § 49-11-613(7) allows a person who is dissatisfied by a decision 
of the Utah State Retirement Board ("Board") to "obtain judicial review by complying 
with the procedures and requirements of Title 63 G, Chapter 4, Administrative Procedures 
Act." Utah Code Ann. §63G-4-403 confers jurisdiction on the Supreme Court or Court 
of Appeals to review all final agency action resulting from formal adjudicative hearings. 
Utah Code Ann. §78A-4-103(2)(a) and Rule 14 of the Utah Rules of Appellate 
Procedure confer jurisdiction on the Court of Appeals over the final orders and decrees 
resulting from formal adjudicative proceedings. 
STATEMENT OF ISSUES 
1. Did the Board correctly apply the plain language of Utah Code Ann. § 49-11-
504(9) (2007) in calculating Kevin McLeod's ("Mr. McLeod's") retirement 
benefit based on two periods of service? 
2. Did the Board correctly deny Mr. McLeod's claim of equitable estoppel against 
Utah Retirement Systems ("URS") as a government agency when Mr. McLeod 
failed to show an unusual circumstance or that URS made a statement to him on 
which he reasonably relied to his detriment? 
STANDARD OF REVIEW 
Mr. McLeod argues that the Board mistakenly calculated his retirement benefit by 
calculating his retirement benefit based on two different periods of service in accordance 
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with Utah Code Ann. §49-11-504(2007). The Court of Appeals has stated that it reviews 
the "Board's application or interpretation of a statute 'as a question of law under the 
correction-of-error standard." Sindt v. Retirement Bd., 2007 UT 16 t 5,157 P.3d 797, 
799. 
Mr. McLeod also argues that the Board should be equitably estopped from 
denying his claim. Mr. McLeod's estoppel "claim presents a mixed question, which 
involves the application of law to fact.'" Terry v. Retirement Bd, 2007 UT App 87, ^  8, 
157 P. 3d 362 (quoting State v. Hamilton, 2003 UT 22, If 33 n. 12, 70 P.3d 111). The 
Court of Appeals has stated that it "reviews the underlying facts for clear error and the 
application of the law to those facts for correctness." See id. f 9. 
DETERMINATIVE STATUTORY PROVISIONS 
Utah Code Ann. §49-11-504(9) (a)(b) (2007): 
(9) Notwithstanding any other provision of this section, a retiree who has returned 
to work, accrued additional service credit, and again retires shall have the retiree's 
allowance recalculated using: 
(a) the formula in effect at the date of the retiree's original retirement for all 
service credit accrued prior to that date; and 
(b) the formula in effect at the date of the subsequent retirement for all service 
credit accrued between the first and subsequent retirement dates. 
Utah Code Ann. §49-11-613(1)(2009), All members, retirees,... or covered individuals of a 
system . . . shall acquaint themselves with their rights and obligations under this title. . . ." 
SUMMARY OF THE PROCEEDINGS 
This is a petition for review from the final order of the Board, dated December 17, 
2009, taken on the Request for Board Action of Mr. McLeod. 
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On August 19, 2009, this matter came before the Board's Hearing Officer, Richard 
C. Howe ("Hearing Officer"), under Utah Code Ann. §49-11-613, for a formal 
administrative hearing on Mr. McLeod's claim that his post-retirement benefits be 
calculated using his post-retirement final average salary for all his years of service. 
Hearing Officer issued a Memorandum Decision on October 14, 2009, denying Mr. 
McLeod's request for additional retirement benefits, holding that the URS correctly 
followed the applicable statute in calculating Mr. McLeod's retirement benefits, and that 
URS was not estopped from calculating his benefit in accordance with the statute under 
common law. On December 17, 2009, the Board adopted the Hearing Officer's Findings 
of Fact, Conclusions of Law and Order. 
SUMMARY OF THE FACTS 
The Hearing Officer made, and the Board adopted, the following findings of fact 
which are the basis of this appeal: 
1. Mr. McLeod worked for Bountiful City and then for the Davis 
County Sheriffs Office accruing just over 20 years of service credit in the 
Public Safety Noncontributory Retirement System by November 1996. 
Hearing Transcript [hereinafter "HT"] 5:4-12. 
2. In or about October 1996, Mr. McLeod was offered a position at 
Browning Arms. HT 9:12-17, 22:[1]5-21. 
3. Mr. McLeod testified that he was concerned about his financial 
situation and determined to call the retirement department at the Utah State 
Retirement Office ("URS") with questions about his benefits. HT 12:2-9. 
4. URS has no record of a telephone call between Mr. McLeod and 
URS at any time during the year 1996. HT 156:16-157:20. However, Mr. 
McLeod claimed to have spoken with URS by telephone at least twice in 
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October or November of 1996 regarding what would happen if he were to 
retire from Davis County, and then come back to work for Davis County at 
a later date. HT 13:3-20:2. 
5. Mr. McLeod failed to provide any verifiable evidence, such as a 
document or a recording, of the substance of any conversations with URS 
in 1996. The only evidence of the substance of these conversations is Mr. 
McLeod's testimony that a URS employee told him if he retired and later 
returned to work for Davis County that his retirement benefit would be 
cancelled upon his reemployment, and that when he retired the second time, 
his benefit would be based on all his years of service credit combined and 
would be calculated as one period of service. 
6. URS disputed Mr. McLeod's assertion that a URS employee told 
him that if he retired and was reemployed, his benefit for all of his years 
would be recalculated at his second retirement based on one period of 
service and using his new and significantly higher three highest years of 
salary. 
7. Mr. McLeod came away from those phone conversations with URS 
with the understanding that he could retire, draw retirement, return in two 
years to the same office, retire later a second time and have his retirement 
benefit calculated on the basis of one period of employment. However, he 
has not met his burden of proof that he was actually told that. 
8. Mr. McLeod retired from his Davis County Sheriffs Office position 
in December 1996 and went to work for Browning Arms. HT 9:12-17, 
22:[1]5-21. 
9. Between December 1996 and January 1999, URS paid Mr. McLeod 
his statutorily earned retirement benefits totaling approximately $50,000. 
HT: 85:8-15. 
10. Mr. McLeod returned to work for Davis County in January 1999, 
and pursuant to the retirement laws, had his retirement benefit cancelled 
while he remained employed. HT 22:25-23:4; 86:7-15. 
11. In March of 2001, while still employed by Davis County, Mr. 
McLeod contacted URS and understood for the first time that his benefit 
would not be calculated the way he wished. HT 37:17-38:21. 
12. Mr. McLeod continued working for the Davis County Sheriffs 
Office until April 16, 2007, when he voluntarily terminated his 
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employment, retired, and began receiving his retirement benefits. HT 47:5-
18;48:2-25. 
13. In April 2007, URS calculated Mr. McLeod's retirement benefit, 
pursuant to the relevant statute, based on two periods of service: 1) the 
service he performed prior to his first retirement, and 2) the service he 
performed between his first and second retirement. URS then added these 
calculations together to determine Mr. McLeod's retirement benefit. Mr. 
McLeod received full retirement service credit for each of his years he 
worked for public employers participating with URS. HT 170:17-23; 240: 
15-22. 
Hearing Record (hereinafter "HR") at 292-96. See, Addendum A. 
In addition to the Board's stated findings of fact, the Board notes that: 
In 1996, URS has no record of a telephone call between Mr. McLeod and URS. 
HT 156:16-157:20. According to URS policy, in 1996, telephone questions regarding 
post-retirement benefit calculation would have been answered by Judy Lund ("Ms. 
Lund"), Director of the Retirement Department at URS. HT 222:24-223:20. Mr. 
McLeod claims that an unnamed URS employee told him that his retirement benefit 
would be cancelled upon his reemployment, his benefit would be based on all his years of 
service credit, and that his benefit would not be adversely or negatively affected by 
working more years. HT 15:9-16:21; 72:4-73:15. Ms. Lund specifically testified at the 
hearing that she would not have told Mr. McLeod what he claims the unidentified URS 
employee said, and that she does not know any URS employee that would have made 
those statements. HT 182:17-183:5; 225:15-226:4 ; 254:2-5. 
Thus, URS specifically disputes Mr. McLeod's assertion that a URS employee 
told him that if he retired and was reemployed, his benefit for all of his years would be 
recalculated at his second retirement using his new and significantly higher three highest 
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years of salary. HT 182:1-183:5; HT 225:10-226:4; and HT 235: 6-23. This was not the 
law in 1996, and despite taking over 20 depositions of current and previous URS 
employees, Mr. McLeod could produce no evidence outside of his own word that URS 
ever made such a statement to him or any other similarly situated individual during this 
time period. Hence, the most likely scenario as to what was said in that phone 
conversation was that Mr. McLeod misunderstood what the URS employee was telling 
him regarding his benefits. 
In fact, all of the actual written communication between URS and Mr. McLeod 
shows that URS was uniformly consistent in informing Mr. McLeod that his benefit 
would be calculated based on two periods of service in accordance with UTAH CODE 
ANN. §49-11-504(9). HRat 171, 174, 176-177, 179, and 182; See a/so, HR at 216; HT: 
39:13-47:21. This statute provides that his first retirement benefit would be reinstated, 
and any new service credit earned after his first retirement would be calculated separately 
and supplement that benefit. 
SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT 
The Hearing Officer correctly determined that URS properly interpreted and 
applied Utah Code Ann. §49-11-504(9)(2007) in calculating Mr. McLeod's retirement 
benefit in 2007. Mr. McLeod "retired" from his position with Davis County in December 
1996 and began receiving retirement benefits with URS. In January 1999, Mr. McLeod 
was reemployed with Davis County, and pursuant to the applicable statute at that time, 
had his retirement benefit cancelled. When Mr. McLeod retired again in April 2007, 
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URS calculated his benefit based on two periods of service in accordance with Utah Code 
Ann. §49-ll-504(9)(2007) which states, 
(9) Notwithstanding any other provision of this section, a retiree who has returned 
to work, accrued additional service credit, and again retires shall have the retiree's 
allowance recalculated using: 
(a) the formula in effect at the date of the retiree's original retirement for all 
service credit accrued prior to that date; and 
(b) the formula in effect at the date of the subsequent retirement for all service 
credit accrued between the first and subsequent retirement dates. 
Utah Code Ann. §49-11-504(9) specifically enumerates two distinct service time periods 
for recalculating a retirement benefit. The statute's plain language requires a 
recalculation based on a) "all service credit accrued prior to [the retiree's original 
retirement] date, and, b) "all service credit accrued between the first and subsequent 
retirement dates." Utah Code Ann. §49-1 l-504(9)(emphasis added). By using the 
conjunction "and" between the two subsections, the Legislature clearly indicated that 
URS should use both applicable formulas in calculating Mr. McLeod's post-retirement 
benefits and not one or the other as Mr. McLeod desires. Thus, these two subsections 
clearly state that the retirement benefit should be calculated in two pieces based on the 
two service time periods. 
However, in the alternative, even if the statute is found to be ambiguous, the 
statutory construction rules and public policy considerations show that URS correctly 
applied the law in calculating Mr. McLeod's benefits. URS is mandated to provide 
retirement benefits on an "actuarially sound basis" and "consistent with sound fiduciary 
and actuarial principals." Utah Code Ann. §49-11-103. Ms. Lund, Director of the 
Retirement Department at URS, testified at the hearing that allowing Mr. McLeod to 
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retire and take benefits for two years, then cancel his benefit and recalculate it one piece 
based on a higher final average salary like he desires, would have a negative actuarial 
impact on the retirement system and increase the retirement contribution rate. HT 233:4-
11. Therefore, the better interpretation of Utah Code Ann. §49-11-504(9) is URS' 
interpretation of how to calculate a post-retired employee's benefit which is consistent 
with "sound actuarial principles" and in accordance with the purpose of Title 49, the Utah 
Retirement Act. 
In addition, to not prevailing under the plain language of the statute, the Hearing 
Officer also correctly determined that Mr. McLeod's estoppel claim against URS failed 
because Mr. McLeod failed to prove an unusual circumstance with such certainty to 
obtain estoppel against URS as a governmental entity, and because even if the Hearing 
Officer applies the common law estoppel rules, Mr. McLeod failed to prove either that 
URS made a statement that it later repudiated or that Mr. McLeod reasonably relied to his 
detriment on that alleged statement. 
"As a general rule, estoppel may not be invoked against a governmental entity. In 
Utah, there is a limited exception to this general principle for 'unusual circumstances' 
'where it is plain that the interests of justice so require.' This exception applies, however, 
only if 'the facts may be found with such certainty, and the injustice suffered is of 
sufficient gravity, to invoke the exception.'" Anderson v. Public Service Comm fn, 839 
P.2d 822, 827 (Utah 1992)(internal citations omitted). Given that Mr. McLeod could not 
produce any evidence other than his own self-serving testimony regarding the substance 
of his alleged conversations with URS in 1996, the Hearing Officer correctly determined 
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that, "I do not find certainty here in trying to reconstruct what was said in oral 
conversations taking place in 1996 between Petitioner [Mr. McLeod] and unknown 
persons at URS." HR at 263 (emphasis added). Because of this lack of certainty about 
the facts, Mr. McLeod failed to prove an "unusual circumstance" or grave injustice 
required to prevail against URS as a governmental entity. 
Even if Mr. McLeod could sustain an estoppel claim against URS as a 
governmental entity, Mr. McLeod cannot prove the elements of estoppel. Specifically, 
Mr. McLeod did not prove that URS made any statement which it later repudiated, nor 
did Mr. McLeod reasonably rely to his detriment on the alleged statements made by URS. 
Utah Courts have stated that in order to prevail on a claim for equitable estoppel, Mr. 
McLeod bears the burden to prove: 
(1) a statement, admission, act, or failure to act by one party inconsistent 
with a claim later asserted; (2) reasonable action or inaction by the other 
party taken on the basis of the first party's statement, admission, act or 
failure to act; and (3) injury to the second party that would result from 
allowing the first party to contradict or repudiate such statement, admission, 
act, or failure to act. 
Holland v. Career Service Review Bd, 856 P.2d 678 (Utah Ct. App. 1993)(rejecting 
employee's equitable estoppel claim); See also, Eldredge v. Utah State Retirement Bd., 
795 P.2d 671, 675 (Utah Ct. App. 1990)(holding that Board was estopped from 
decreasing member's benefit after he terminated his employment and retired). Mr. 
McLeod cannot meet either of the first two elements of estoppel, let alone all of them as 
required to prevail. 
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First, Mr. McLeod failed to prove that URS made a statement to him which was 
incorrect as required under the first element of estoppel. 
In order to prevail under this element, Mr. McLeod must challenge the Board's 
findings of fact. However, Mr. McLeod failed to properly challenge the Board's findings 
of fact because he did not "marshal the evidence" supporting the Hearing Officer's 
findings as required under Rule 24 of the Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure. However, 
even if this Court were to review the Board's findings for "clear error", the hearing 
record supports the Board's findings. 
In addition, a finding of fact of a statement by URS could not have been made by 
the Hearing Officer to effectuate estoppel because the sole evidence of a statement made 
by URS was Mr. McLeod's disputed testimony of the 1996 conversations which was 
inadmissible hearsay, and under Utah law cannot be the sole basis for a finding of fact. 
In Utah, administrative hearings are allowed to accept otherwise non-admissible hearsay 
into evidence, but such hearsay evidence cannot be the sole basis for a finding of fact. 
The Utah Administrative Procedures Act in Utah Code Ann. §63G-4-206(l)(c) states, 
"The presiding officer may not exclude evidence solely because it is hearsay." However, 
Utah Code Ann. §63G-4-208(3) limits the findings of fact which can be based on hearsay 
in stating, "A finding of fact that was contested may not be based solely on hearsay 
evidence unless that evidence is admissible under the Utah Rules of Evidence." Because 
the only evidence of the alleged 1996 conversations with URS was Mr. McLeod's 
hearsay testimony, as a matter of law, a finding of fact could not have been made 
claiming URS made a statement which it later repudiated. 
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Second, Mr. McLeod cannot meet the second element of estoppel, which is the 
reasonable action or inaction by the other party taken on the basis of the first party's 
statement, admission, act or failure to act. Hearing Officer Howe correctly determined in 
his Decision: 
Here, a major career decision rested upon the answers to [Mr. McLeod's] 
telephone inquiries. Or, as he testified, it was a "life changing" decision. 
[HT 58:19-22 and HT 131:6-8] He could have requested written 
confirmation from URS of the answers to the questions he asked. He could 
have made a written record of the persons he talked to and their position in 
URS. He could have had a professional review the statutes to verify what 
he claims he had been told. A greater in-depth inquiry was warranted in 
this major career decision than just two relatively brief telephone calls to 
unnamed persons at URS. 
HRat263. 
Thus, the Hearing Officer correctly determined that Mr. McLeod failed to prove 
his claim for estoppel against the Board as a governmental entity. Mr. McLeod did not 
prove the "facts with specificity," nor "injustice of sufficient gravity" to invoke any 
exception to the general rule that estoppel may not be invoked against a governmental 
entity. Anderson v. Public Service Comm % 839 P.2d at 827. In addition, Mr. McLeod 
failed to prove the elements of estoppel because he could not prove URS made an 
incorrect statement, or that he reasonably relied on that statement. 
ARGUMENT 
I. URS CORRECTLY INTERPRETED AND APPLIED U T A H CODE ANN. §49-11-
504(9)(2007) IN CALCULATING MR. MCLEOD'S RETIREMENT BENEFIT WHICH 
DIRECTS URS TO CALCULATE POST-RETIREMENT BENEFITS BASED ON TWO 
PERIODS OF SERVICE. 
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Utah Code Ann. §49-1l-504(9)(2007), which governs retirement benefits for post-
retired employees, unambiguously requires URS to calculate Mr. McLeod5 s retirement 
benefit based on two different periods of service. URS correctly did so for Mr. McLeod 
by adding the retirement benefit he earned prior to his first retirement in December 1996, 
to the retirement benefit he earned between 1999 and 2007, when he retired a second 
time. The statute states in relevant part: 
(9) Notwithstanding any other provision of this section, a retiree who has returned 
to work, accrued additional service credit, and again retires shall have the retiree's 
allowance recalculated using: 
(a) the formula in effect at the date of the retiree's original retirement for all 
service credit accrued prior to that date; and 
(b) the formula in effect at the date of the subsequent retirement for all service 
credit accrued between the first and subsequent retirement dates. 
Despite Mr. McLeod's contentions to the contrary, the applicable statute in this 
case is the statute in effect at the time the disputed benefit calculation was made. Here, 
the 2007 statute governs the calculation of Mr. McLeod5 s disputed retirement benefit, not 
the 1999 or 2000 statute when he returned to work, because 2007 is when Mr. McLeod5s 
retirement benefit was calculated. Nevertheless, even if the 2000 statute is used, Mr. 
McLeod still does not prevail because the language is plain in supporting URS5 
calculation of his retirement benefit.1 
1
 Utah Code Ann. §49-l-505(4)(1996), section 49-1 l-5045s predecessor, states in relevant 
part, "If a member is reinstated to active service and subsequently retires after the two-
year period as provided in Subsection (l)(a)(iv), the member's retirement allowance shall 
be calculated using: (a) the formula in effect at the date of the member's original 
retirement for all service prior to that date; and (b) the formula in effect at the date of the 
subsequent retirement for all service rendered between the first and the subsequent 
retirement dates.55 There is no substantive difference between this language and the 
language in the 2007 statute. 
12 
When interpreting a statute, the Utah Supreme Court has held that, "'[u]nder our 
rules of statutory construction, we look first to the statute's plain language to determine 
its meaning.'" Sindt v. Utah State Ret. Bd, 2007 UT 16, ^ }8, 157 P.3d 797, (Utah 2007) 
{quoting, Mountain Estates v. State Tax Comm % 2004 UT 86, %99 100 P.3d 1206). 
"Only if we find some ambiguity need we look further." CIG Exploration, Inc. v. Tax 
Comm yn, 897 P.2d 1214, 1216 (Utah 1995)(finding phrase "erroneously or illegally 
collected" in refund statute was not ambiguous and State Tax Commission correctly 
assessed taxes based on property valuation as of statutory valuation date). However, 
"[t]he fact that the parties offer differing constructions of the statute, in and of itself, does 
not mean that the statute is 'ambiguous.' See, Eppersen v. Utah State Retirement Bd., 949 
P.2d 779, 783 n.6 (Utah Ct. App. 1997). 'Ambiguous' means capable of 'two or more 
plausible meanings.'" Derbidge v. Mutual Protective Ins. Co., 963 P.2d 788, 791 (Utah 
Ct. App. 1998)(quoting, Alfv. State Farm Fire & Cas. Co., 850 P.2d 1272, 1274 (Utah 
1993); Village InnApts. v. State Farm Fire & Cas. Co., 790 P.2d 581, 583 (Utah Ct. App. 
1990)). Further, "[Statutory enactments are to be so construed as to render all parts 
thereof relevant and meaningful." Perrine v. Kennecott Mining Corp., 911 P.2d 1290, 
1292 (Utah 1996)(citation and quotation omitted). "It is our duty to construe each act of 
the legislature so as to give it full force and effect." Jordan School Dist. v. Sandy City 
Corp., 2004 UT 37, f9, 94 P.3d 234, 237-38, quoting, Jerz v. Salt Lake County, 822 P.2d 
770, 773 (Utah 1991). 
In this case, in accordance with the plain language of the statute, URS calculated 
Mr. McLeod's benefit by adding the retirement benefit he earned prior to his first 
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retirement in December 1996, to the retirement benefit he earned between 1999 and 
2007, his second retirement date. The statute states: 
9) Notwithstanding any other provision of this section, a retiree who has 
returned to work, accrued additional service credit, and again retires shall 
have the retiree's allowance recalculated using: 
(a) the formula in effect at the date of the retiree's original retirement for all 
service credit accrued prior to that date; and 
(b) the formula in effect at the date of the subsequent retirement for all 
service credit accrued between the first and subsequent retirement dates. 
Mr. McLeod attempts to manufacture some ambiguity in the statute in claiming 
that the word "formula" is ambiguous. See, Brief of Appellant at 40. Yet, he offers no 
different interpretation of the word "formula" than what has already been accepted by 
URS. URS and Mr. McLeod both agree that "formula" means the applicable retirement 
formula used to calculate a retirement benefit, in this case, the public safety 
noncontributory retirement system formula found in Utah Code Ann.§49-15-402(2007). 
That formula will be different for each retirement system, but there is no dispute or 
ambiguity as to the meaning of the word as used by the Legislature. 
Instead, Mr. McLeod incorrectly argues that when the statute states that a person 
in Mr. McLeod's situation will accrue "additional service credit" after retiring and 
returning to the system, that this means his retirement benefit will be calculated based on 
one term of service rather than two. Mr. McLeod's interpretation belies the plain 
meaning of the statute for two reasons: 1) calculation of the retirement benefit is different 
from service credit accrual; and 2) the Legislature clearly delineated two "terms of 
service" in Utah Code sections 49-1 l-504(9)(a) and (9)(b), and used the conjunction 
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"and", instead of "or" in describing how retirement benefits should be calculated. Each 
of these reasons is discussed below. 
First, in his argument Mr. McLeod incorrectly attempts to mix the issues of 
service credit accrual with the issue of the proper calculation of his retirement benefit. 
Mr. McLeod received "full credit" for his post-retirement employment with Davis 
County Sheriffs Office between 1999 and when he retired a second time in 2007. When 
his retirement benefit was recalculated in 2007, his retirement benefit for his service 
between 1999 and 2007 was calculated pursuant to the applicable public safety formula 
and added to his previous retirement benefit and his past credit earned. Thus, the 
retirement benefit Mr. McLeod received in 2007 was significantly greater than the 
retirement benefit he received in 1996 when he retired the first time. Hence, Mr. McLeod 
was placed back into the applicable retirement system in all respects as the statute 
dictates. He earned additional service credit and increased his retirement benefits in 
accordance with the applicable statutes. Although his retirement benefit was not 
calculated as he wished, he was a member of the system and was treated in all respects 
like every other similarly situated individual. 
Second, Utah Code Ann. §49-11-504(9) specifically enumerates two distinct 
service time periods for recalculating a retirement benefit. The statute's plain language 
requires a recalculation based on a) "all service credit accrued prior to [the retiree's 
original retirement] date, and, b) "all service credit accrued between the first and 
subsequent retirement dates." Utah Code Ann. §49-1 l-504(9)(emphasis added). These 
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two provisions clearly state that the benefit should be calculated in two pieces based on 
the two service time periods. Finding otherwise would render this part of the statute 
"meaningless" in violation of the statutory construction rules. Perrine v. Kennecott 
Mining Corp,, 911 P.2d 1290, 1292 (Utah 1996)(holding "statutory enactments are to be 
so construed as to render all parts thereof relevant and meaningful, and ... interpretations 
are to be avoided which render some part of a provision nonsensical or absurd.") 
In addition, if the statute, as Mr. McLeod suggests, would have allowed the 
calculation of Mr. McLeod's retirement benefit based on the combination of Mr. 
McLeod's service, presumably the Legislature would have used the word "or" instead of 
"and" between §§49-1 l-504(9)(a) and (b). By using the word "and", the Legislature 
clearly indicated that URS should use both applicable formulas in calculating Mr. 
McLeod's retirement benefits and not one or the other as Mr. McLeod desires. 
Nevertheless, the plain language of the statute requires URS to calculate Mr. 
McLeod's retirement benefit exactly as it did, by calculating his retirement benefit based 
on two periods of service. 
IL IN THE ALTERNATIVE, EVEN IF THE COURT FINDS AMBIGUITY IN SECTION 49-11-
504(9), THE RULES OF STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION FAVOR URS' TERPRETATION 
BECAUSE CONSTRUING OTHERWISE RENDERS THE STATUTE SUPERFLUOUS AND 
VIOLATES THE STATED PURPOSES OF TITLE 49. 
As stated supra, Utah Code Ann. §49-11-504(9) contains no ambiguity. However, 
in the alternative, if ambiguity is found, the statutory construction rules and public policy 
considerations show that URS correctly applied the law in calculating Mr. McLeod's 
benefits. Utah common law regarding statutory construction requires that finders of fact 
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look to the legislative history and policy considerations when interpreting ambiguous 
statutes. "Only when [the Court] fmd[s] ambiguity in the statute's plain language need 
[the Court] seek guidance from the legislative history and relevant policy considerations." 
World Peace Movement of Am. v. Newspaper Agency Corp., 879 P.2d 253, 259 (Utah 
1994). '"When interpreting an ambiguous statute, [the Court] first tr[ies] to discover the 
underlying intent of the legislature, guided by the purpose of the statute as a whole and 
the legislative history.' Hansen v. Salt Lake Co., 794 P.2d 838, 841 (Utah 1990)(citations 
omitted). [The court] then tr[ies] to harmonize ambiguous provisions accordingly. 
Clover v. Snowbird Ski Resort, 808 P.2d 1037, 1045 (Utah 1991)." Sullivan v. Scoular 
Grain Co., 853 P.2d 877 (Utah 1993). 
The Legislature set forth the purpose of Title 49 in Utah Code Ann. §49-11-103: 
(1) The purpose of this title is to establish: 
(a) retirement systems and the Utah Governors' and Legislators' Retirement 
Plan for members which provide: 
(i) a uniform system of membership; 
(ii) retirement requirements; 
(iii) benefits for members; 
(iv) funding on an actuarially sound basis; 
(v) contributions; and 
(vi) economy and efficiency in public service; and 
(b) a central administrative office and a board to administer the various 
systems, plans, and programs established by the Legislature or the board. 
(2) This title shall be liberally construed to provide maximum benefits and 
protections consistent with sound fiduciary and actuarial principals. 
(emphasis added). 
Hence, URS is mandated to provide retirement benefits on an "actuarially sound 
basis" and "consistent with sound fiduciary and actuarial principals." Judy Lund, 
Director of the Retirement Department, testified at the hearing that allowing Mr. McLeod 
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to retire and take benefits for two years, then cancel his benefit and recalculate it on a 
higher final average salary, like he desires, would have a negative actuarial impact on the 
retirement system and increase the retirement contribution rate. HT 233:4-11. She stated 
that Mr. McLeod's benefit that he received between December 1996 and January 1999 is 
worth "$139,407.20" in today's dollars. HT 234:15. Thus, if Mr. McLeod is allowed to 
calculate his benefit as he desires, he will receive an approximate $140,000 windfall 
which he did not earn and the law does not allow. 
Indeed, it hardly takes an actuary to understand that if you pay into a system for a 
few years, then begin drawing benefits from that system for a time without putting any 
additional money in, you will have less money (all other things being equal) than an 
individual who puts the same amount of money in an account, but does not draw on that 
money in the first place. Therefore, the better interpretation of Utah Code Ann. §49-11-
504(9) is URS' interpretation of how to calculate a post-retired employee's benefit which 
is consistent with "sound actuarial principles" and in accordance with the purpose of Title 
49. 
In contrast, Mr. McLeod's interpretation of Utah Code Ann. §49-11-504(9) cannot 
be accepted because doing so would render that section insignificant and superfluous. In 
Sutherland's Rules of Statutory Construction, often quoted by Utah Courts, it states, "A 
statute should be construed so that effect is given to all its provisions, so that no part will 
be inoperative or superfluous, void or insignificant. . . . " §46.06. Utah Courts have 
similarly held, "[Statutory enactments are to be so construed as to render all parts thereof 
relevant and meaningful." Perrine v. Kennecott Mining Corp,, 911 P.2d 1290, 1292 
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(Utah 1996)(citation and quotation omitted). "It is our duty to construe each act of the 
legislature so as to give it full force and effect." Jordan SchoolDist. v. Sandy City Corp., 
2004 UT 37, \9, 94 P.3d 234, 237-38, quoting, Jerz v. Salt Lake County, 822 P.2d 770, 
773 (Utah 1991). 
Despite the clear law, Mr. McLeod incorrectly claims that his benefit should be 
calculated based on one period of service rather than the two that the statute requires 
because of his retirement. He claims that 49-11-504(9) should be interpreted to mean 
that a post-retirement benefit will only be calculated in two pieces if the legislature 
happened to change the retirement formula between the first and second retirement dates. 
See, Brief of Appellant at 41. However, such an interpretation to Utah Code Ann. §49-
11-504(9) would render it unnecessary or "superfluous" because any new legislative 
action changing the retirement formula would automatically apply prospectively. 
Contrary to Mr. McLeod5 s arguments, the Legislature had no need for a separate statute 
allowing it to pass laws affecting retirement benefits in the future because it specifically 
was granted that power through the Utah Constitution. See, Ut. Const, art. VI, § 1(1). 
Mr. McLeod's interpretation of Utah Code Ann. §49-11-501(9) seems to indicate that the 
Legislature merely wanted to clarify its position that it could change the "formula" and 
that it would have an effect at some future time. One wonders whether Mr. McLeod also 
believes that the Legislature needs to clarify its ability to pass laws in every section of the 
Utah Code. Thus, Mr. McLeod's interpretation of the statute is superfluous and renders 
the statute insignificant in violation of the statutory construction rules. 
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Hence, even if Utah Code Ann. §49-11-504(9) is found to be ambiguous, URS' 
interpretation of the statute should prevail because URS' interpretation is consistent with 
"sound actuarial principles" in accordance with the purpose of the statute, and because 
Mr. McLeod's interpretation renders the statute "superfluous." Utah Code Ann. §49-11-
504(9) is clear that Mr. McLeod's retirement benefit should be calculated based on two 
periods of service, which is exactly how URS calculated his retirement benefit. 
III. BECAUSE MR. MCLEOD FAILED TO PROVE AN UNUSUAL CIRCUMSTANCE, THAT 
URS MADE A STATEMENT WHICH IT LATER REPUDIATED, OR THAT HE 
REASONABLY RELIED ON URS' STATEMENTS TO HIS DETRIMENT, HE CANNOT 
PREVAIL ON A CLAIM FOR EQUITABLE ESTOPPEL AGAINST THE BOARD AS A 
GOVERNMENT AGENCY. 
Mr. McLeod cannot prevail against URS under equitable estoppel because Mr. 
McLeod failed to prove an unusual circumstance with such certainty to obtain estoppel 
against URS as a governmental entity, and because even if the Hearing Officer applies 
the common law estoppel rules, Mr. McLeod failed to prove either that URS made a 
statement that it later repudiated or that Mr. McLeod reasonably relied to his detriment on 
that alleged statement. 
A. Estoppel Cannot Be Invoked Against a Government Entity Absent 
Unusual Circumstances and Grave Injustice. 
"As a general rule, estoppel may not be invoked against a governmental entity. In 
Utah, there is a limited exception to this general principle for 'unusual circumstances' 
'where it is plain that the interests of justice so require/ This exception applies, however, 
only if 'the facts may be found with such certainty, and the injustice suffered is of 
sufficient gravity, to invoke the exception.'" Anderson v. Public Service Comm 'n, 839 
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P.2d 822, 827 (Utah 1992)(fmding that Commission was not estopped from revoking 
limousine company's certificate of convenience and necessity after allegedly orally 
settling all claims against company)(citations omitted). This governmental estoppel rule 
has been characterized by the Utah Court of Appeals as a, "high standard of proof " 
Terry v. Retirement Bd.9 2007 UT 87, If 15, 157 P.3d 362, 366. 
The Utah Supreme Court has stated the following regarding the policy behind the 
general government estoppel rule: 
We have no doubt about the soundness nor the salutary purpose of the rule that 
estoppel generally is not assertable against the government or governmental 
institutions. There are good and sufficient reasons for that rule, including the 
safeguarding of the interests of the public, which are often somewhat in hazard 
because of the vagaries of political tides, frequent changes of public officials, the 
possibility of collusion, or of circumventing procedures set up by law, then suing 
for the value of goods furnished or services rendered. 
Utah State Univ. v. Sutro & Co., 646 P.2d 715, 718 (Utah 1982). Thus, if Mr. 
McLeod is able to prevail against the Board for estoppel without evidence other than his 
word that he was told incorrect information, it would undoubtedly open the door for 
additional claims of less dubious merit at eventual great cost to the State and its political 
subdivisions in increased retirement contribution rates to pay for these claims. 
Certainly this policy played into Hearing Officer Howe's decision that "I do not 
find certainty here in trying to reconstruct what was said in oral conversations taking 
place in 1996 between Petitioner [Mr. McLeod] and unknown persons at URS." HR at 
263 (emphasis added). Thus, Mr. McLeod failed to prove an "unusual circumstance" or 
grave injustice because the substance of his alleged conversations with URS could not be 
found with "certainty". Id. 
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B. Mr. McLeod's Claim for Estoppel Against the Board Fails for Lack of 
a Statement Made by URS which was Inconsistent with a Claim Later 
Asserted, and for Mr. McLeod's Lack of Reasonable Reliance to his 
Detriment on those Alleged Statements. 
Even if Mr. McLeod could sustain an estoppel claim against the Board as a 
governmental entity, Mr. McLeod cannot prove the elements of estoppel. Specifically, 
Mr. McLeod did not prove that URS made any statement which it later repudiated, nor 
did Mr. McLeod reasonably rely to his detriment on the alleged statements made by URS. 
Utah Courts have stated that in order to prevail on a claim for equitable estoppel, Mr. 
McLeod bears the burden to prove: 
(1) a statement, admission, act, or failure to act by one party inconsistent 
with a claim later asserted; (2) reasonable action or inaction by the other 
party taken on the basis of the first party's statement, admission, act or 
failure to act; and (3) injury to the second party that would result from 
allowing the first party to contradict or repudiate such statement, admission, 
act, or failure to act. 
Hollandv. Career Service Review Bd.y 856 P.2d 678 (Utah Ct. App. 1993)(rejecting 
employee's equitable estoppel claim); See also, Eldredge v. Utah State Retirement Bd., 
795 P.2d 671, 675 (Utah Ct. App. 1990)(holding that Board was estopped from 
decreasing member's benefit after he terminated his employment and retired). Mr. 
McLeod cannot meet either of the first two elements of estoppel, let alone all of them as 
required to prevail. 
i. Mr. McLeod failed to prove URS made a statement to him which it 
later repudiated. 
At the hearing, Mr. McLeod failed to prove URS ever made an incorrect or 
inconsistent statement to him. The first element of estoppel is a statement made by one 
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party inconsistent with a claim later asserted. Holland v. Career Service Review Bd.y 856 
P.2d 678 (Utah Ct. App. 1993) In order to challenge the Board's finding that Mr. 
McLeod never received a statement by URS that URS later repudiated, Mr. McLeod must 
properly marshal the evidence and then show how the finding was "clear error." 
a. Mr. McLeod failed to properly marshal the evidence to correctly 
challenge the Hearing Officer's finding that URS never made a 
statement to Mr. McLeod which it later repudiated. 
Mr. McLeod failed to correctly challenge the Hearing Officer's findings of fact 
numbers four through seven, that Mr. McLeod failed to show URS made a statement to 
him which it later repudiated, because he did not "marshal the evidence" supporting those 
findings as required under Rule 24(a)(9) of the Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure and 
the common law. In order to prevail on a claim for estoppel under the common law 
elements, Mr. McLeod must show that URS made a statement to him that it later 
repudiated. Holland v. Career Service Review Bd., 856 P.2d 678 (Utah Ct. App. 1993) 
(To show estoppel, a Plaintiff must prove, "(1) a statement, admission, act, or failure to 
act by one party inconsistent with a claim later asserted . . .".) Although Mr. McLeod 
never affirmatively states he is challenging any of the Board's findings of fact, in his 
argument on estoppel, he certainly implies that he is challenging those facts. Thus, the 
2
 In his Appellate Brief, Mr. McLeod specifically argues that the Retirement Office made 
statements to him which it later repudiated. For example, McLeod brief makes the 
following statements: "The numerous statements by employees of the Retirement Office 
to Kevin McLeod clearly satisfy the first element for a claim of equitable estoppel[.]..." 
Brief of the Appellant at 31; "[Mr. McLeod] was told on both [1996] occasions the same 
thing [by the Retirement Office], that it would make no difference,... and that his total 
retirement would be calculated based on his full years of service . . . " Brief of the 
Appellant at 29-30; "Because of the statements and assured attitude of the retirement 
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Board presumes that Mr. McLeod is challenging the Board's factual findings that Mr. 
McLeod was never actually told that he could have his retirement benefit calculated the 
way he now desires. 
Utah R.App.P. 24(a)(9) states that "A party challenging a fact finding must first 
marshal all record evidence that supports the challenged finding." The Utah Supreme 
Court has held that "To successfully challenge an agency's factual findings, the party 
'must mar shall [sic] all of the evidence supporting the findings and show that despite the 
supporting facts, and in light of the conflicting or contradictory evidence, the findings are 
not supported by substantial evidence.5" Martinez v. Media-Paymaster Plus, 2007 UT 
42, [^16, 164 P.3d 384, 390, quoting, Grace Drilling Co. v. Board of Review of Indus. 
Comm'n, 776 P.2d 63, 68 (Utah Ct. App. 1989). 
The Utah Supreme Court has more recently added: 
To adequately fulfill the marshaling requirement, the appellant must 
temporarily assume the role of his adversary, presenting us, "in 
comprehensive and fastidious order, every scrap of competent evidence 
introduced at trial which supports the very findings the appellant resists." 
Chen v. Stewart, 2004 UT 82, % 77, 100 P.3d 1177 (quoting Neely v. 
Bennett, 2002 UT App 189, f 11, 51 P.3d 724). A recital of the trial court's 
findings with which the appellant disagrees does not amount to marshaling. 
Rather, the appellant must educate the court as to exactly how the trial court 
arrived at each of the challenged findings. This requires "a precisely 
focused summary of all the evidence supporting the findings," correlated to 
the location of that evidence in the record. Id. Failure to provide this 
summary amounts to an invitation to the appellate court to invest its time 
and resources to "go behind the trial court's factual findings" itself; an 
officer that he talked to, McLeod left the Davis County Sheriffs Office with a high level 
of comfort that his retirement would not be adversely affected." Brief of Appellant at 30; 
and, "Nevertheless, we can be assured that those comments [by the Retirement Office 
regarding how his retirement benefit would be calculated] were made . . ." Brief of 
Appellant at 30. 
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invitation which the appellate court may, in its discretion, refuse. Id. ^ 82 n. 
16. 
Therefore, appellants must first "present the evidence in a light most 
favorable to the trial court and not attempt to construe the evidence in a 
light favorable to their case." United Park City Mines Co. v. Stichting 
Mayflower Mountain Fonds, 2006 UT 35, ^  26, 140 P.3d 1200 (internal 
quotation marks omitted). Then, appellants must "explain why those 
findings contradict the clear weight of the evidence." Id. Once appellants 
have established every pillar supporting their adversary's position, they then 
must ferret out a fatal flaw in the evidence and show why those pillars fail 
to support the trial court's findings. They must show the trial court's 
findings are so lacking in support as to be against the clear weight of the 
evidence, thus making them clearly erroneous. Oneida/SLIC v. Oneida 
Cold Storage & Warehouse, Inc., 872 P.2d 1051, 1053 (Utah Ct.App.1994) 
(internal quotation marks and citations omitted). 
Friends of Maple Mountain, Inc. v. Mapleton City, 2010 UT 11,1H|10, 12, 
228 P.3d 1242. 
In this case, Mr. McLeod made no attempt to comply with the "marshaling" 
requirement of Rule 24 of the Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure. McLeod failed to 
provide a "precisely focused summary" of the evidence in the "light most favorable" to 
the Hearing Officer's findings and failed to show any fatal flaws in the Hearing Officer's 
findings. Although Mr. McLeod's Appellate Brief set forth 13 pages and 81 separate 
"relevant facts", some of which were inconsistent with the Hearing Officer's factual 
findings , he did not properly challenge the Board's findings of fact because of his failure 
to "marshal the evidence" as required to challenge such factual findings before an 
appellate court under Rule 24 of the Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure. It appears that 
3
 See e.g. Mr. McLeod's Appellate Brief facts 10, 12-13, 18, 28, and 33, asserting as a 
fact that in 1996 URS made an incorrect statement to Mr. McLeod regarding how his 
benefit would be calculated. Brief of Appellant at 14-15, 17. Mr. McLeod's Appellate 
Brief facts also mischaracterized much of Ms. Judy Lund's testimony. Brief of Appellant 
at 20-24. 
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Mr. McLeod failed to realize that u[t]his court does not retry the facts, Crookston v. Fire 
Ins. Exck, 817 P.2d 789, 800 (Utah 1991); it reviews them for clear error. Housekeeper 
v. State, 2008 UT 78, ^|18, 197 P.3d 636." Friends of Maple Mountain, Inc. v. Mapleton 
City, 2010 UT 11,1fl2, 228 P.3d 1242. 
Although no specific remedy is warranted for a failure to marshal the evidence, the 
Utah Appellate Courts have held that, "[i]f the marshaling requirement is not m e t . . . [the 
Courts] assume that the evidence supports the trial court's findings" and may "affirm . . . 
on that basis alone." Commercial Debenture Corp. v. Amenti, Inc., 2010 UT 10, ^ [14, 231 
P.3d 804, 807, quoting, Chen v. Stewart, 2004 UT 82, TJ80, 100 P.3d 1177, 1196 (internal 
quotation marks omitted); see also; Friends, 2010 UT 11^ [^13 ("As Friends has not met 
the marshaling requirement, we will assume that the trial court's findings are supported 
by the evidence and therefore are not clearly erroneous."). Because Mr. McLeod cannot 
marshal the evidence in a reply brief (See e.g., Atlas Steel, Inc. v. Utah State Tax 
Comm % 2002 UT 112, fflf 40-41, 61 P.3d 1053 (attempting to marshal evidence in a 
reply brief were "eleventh hour" tactics which denies appellee the chance to respond and 
defend the evidence.)), and because the Hearing Officer, Hearing Officer, made clear his 
findings of fact which are supported by the evidence, URS respectfully requests that this 
Court refuse to look behind the Hearing Officer's factual findings. 
b. Even if this Court determines to review the Hearing Officer's 
findings of fact, the hearing record supports the Hearing Officer's 
findings that URS never made a statement to Mr. McLeod which it 
later repudiated. 
26 
The hearing record shows that the Board's findings of fact are supported by the 
record and are not "clear error." The Utah Court of Appeals has held that the standard of 
review in estoppel cases before the retirement board present "a mixed question, which 
'involves the application of law to fact.'" Terry v. Retirement Bd., 2007 UT App 87, % 8, 
157 P.3d 362 (quoting State v. Hamilton, 2003 UT 22, % 33 n.12, 70 P.3d 111). We 
review the underlying facts for clear error and the application of the law to those facts for 
correctness. See id" Whitaker v. Retirement Bd, 2008 UT App 282, f 11, 191 P.3d 814. 
The "clear error" standard of review comes from Rule 52(a) of the Utah Rules of Civil 
Procedure which states in relevant part, "[fjindings of fact, whether based on oral or 
documentary evidence, shall not be set aside unless clearly erroneous, and due regard 
shall be given to the opportunity of the trial court to judge the credibility of the 
witnesses." Thus, in challenging a factual finding, McLeod bears the burden to show that 
the factual finding was "clearly erroneous." 
A hearing officer's finding of fact is only clearly erroneous if it is so lacking in 
support as to be against the "clear weight of the evidence." Uncon Utah, LLC v. Fluor 
Ames Kraemer, LLC, 2009 UT 7, f 11, 210 P.3d 263, quoting In re Estate ofBartell, 116 
P.2d 885, 886 (Utah 1989); See alsoy Chen v. Stewart, 2004 UT 82, Tfl9, 100 P.3d 1177, 
1184. In addition, "[t]he trial court's factual findings will not be considered clearly 
erroneous unless they are 'not adequately supported by the record, resolving all disputes 
in the evidence in a light most favorable to the trial court's determination.'" Save Our 
Schs. v. Bd. OfEduc, 2005 UT 55, % 9, 122 P.3d 611, 613, quoting State v. Pena, 869 
P.2d 932, 936 (Utah 1994). In this case, because the Hearing Officer's findings of fact 
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are supported by the clear weight of the evidence, particularly in light that all disputes 
must be resolved in favor of the Hearing Officer's findings of fact, they are not "clear 
error" and must be upheld. 
Specifically, the Hearing Officer's relevant findings of fact are numbers four 
through seven. They state: 
4. URS has no record of a telephone call between Mr. McLeod and URS at 
any time during the year 1996. HT 156:16-157:20. However, Mr. McLeod 
claimed to have spoken with URS by telephone at least twice in October or 
November of 1996 regarding what would happen if he were to retire from 
Davis County, and then come back to work for Davis County at a later date. 
HT 13:3-20:2. 
5. Mr. McLeod failed to provide any verifiable evidence, such as a document 
or a recording, of the substance of any conversations with URS in 1996. 
The only evidence of the substance of these conversations is Mr. McLeod's 
testimony that a URS employee told him if he retired and later returned to 
work for Davis County that his retirement benefit would be cancelled upon 
his reemployment, and that when he retired the second time his benefit 
would be based on all his years of service credit combined and would be 
calculated as one period of service. 
6. URS disputed Mr. McLeod's assertion that a URS employee told him that 
if he retired and was reemployed, his benefit for all of his years would be 
recalculated at his second retirement based on one period of service and 
using his new and significantly higher three highest years of salary. 
7. Mr. McLeod came away from those phone conversations with URS with 
the understanding that he could retire, draw retirement, return in two years 
to the same office, retire later a second time and have his retirement benefit 
calculated on the basis of one period of employment. However, he has not 
met his burden of proof that he was actually told that. 
HR at 293-94. 
Each of these facts is supported by the testimony taken at the hearing. For 
example, Ms. Judy Lund, Retirement Director at URS testified at the hearing that URS 
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has no record of any phone call from Mr. McLeod to URS in 1996. HT 147:24 - 148:12 
and HT 156:9 - 157:20. Despite Mr. McLeod claiming he spoke with URS twice in 1996 
regarding retirement options, URS specifically disputed Mr. McLeod's version of the 
substance of these phone calls. HT 225:10-226:4; 235:6-23. Ms. Lund also testified that, 
pursuant to URS policy in 1996, any phone calls regarding post-retirement retirement 
calculation questions, like the ones Mr. McLeod alleged he asked, would have been 
transferred to her. HT 182:1-183:5. Ms. Lund testified that she knew the correct answer 
to the questions Mr. McLeod was alleged to have asked URS in 1996 and that she would 
not have told Mr. McLeod that his final benefit would be calculated on one period of 
employment as Mr. McLeod now desires. HT 222:24-223:20; HT 182:1-183:5; HT 235: 
6-23. In addition, Ms. Lund was specifically not aware of anyone else at URS that would 
have said what Mr. McLeod claims was said. HT 223: 6-20; 225:10-25. 
Most significantly, the sole evidence presented to prove that Mr. McLeod was told 
that he could calculate his post-retirement benefit on one period is Mr. McLeod's own 
self-serving testimony that URS told him that was the case in several brief phone 
conversations in 1996, almost 13 years prior to the hearing. Mr. McLeod provided no 
other witnesses to the conversation. In addition, Mr. McLeod provided no written 
statement from URS confirming his alleged conversation with URS. In fact, all the 
written correspondence between Mr. McLeod and URS confirms URS's position that he 
was consistently told that his benefit would be calculated in two pieces. See, HR at 171, 
174,176-177,179, and 182. 
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These facts supported the hearing officer's conclusion in his Decision that 
although Petitioner believed he could "retire, draw retirement, return in two years to the 
same office, retire a second time and have his retirement benefit calculated on the basis of 
one period of employment... I cannot find that [Petitioner] was actually told that in 
either [1996 phone] call." HR at 262. 
Thus, because the Hearing Officer's findings of fact are supported by the Hearing 
Record, they are not against the "clear weight of the evidence", and should be upheld. 
By upholding the findings of fact that URS never made a statement to Mr. McLeod which 
it later repudiated, Mr. McLeod5 s claim for estoppel against the Board of necessity fails. 
c. Disputed oral statements that are inadmissible hearsay are not 
enough to prove a statement was made to effectuate estoppel against 
a governmental entity. 
In addition to the reasons already discussed supra, a statement by URS could not 
be found by the Hearing Officer to effectuate estoppel against URS because disputed oral 
representations alone are not enough to prove a statement against a governmental entity, 
and because the sole evidence of a statement made by URS was Mr. McLeod's disputed 
testimony of the conversations which was inadmissible hearsay, and under Utah law 
cannot be the sole basis for a finding of fact. 
Despite Mr. McLeod's arguments, disputed oral statements are not enough to 
prevail against a governmental entity on a claim for estoppel. See e.g. Terry v. 
Retirement Bd, 2007 UT App 87, Whitaker v. Utah State Retirement Bd.9 2008 UT App 
282, 191 P.3d 814. In both Terry and Whitaker, the Court found that general written 
statements (a life insurance policy and retirement annual statements) were not enough to 
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prevail on a claim for estoppel. Therefore, if these written statements are not enough to 
effectuate estoppel, it logically follows that disputed oral representations can never be 
enough to prevail on an estoppel claim. As the Utah Supreme Court noted in Anderson v. 
Public Service Comm % 839 P.2d 822, 827 (Utah 1992), "The few cases in which Utah 
courts have permitted estoppel against the government have involved very specific 
written representations by authorized government entities." Id. (emphasis added). 
For example, Mr. McLeod mistakenly relies on Eldredge v. Retirement Bd, 795 
P.2d 671, 675 (Utah App. 1990) as his authority for why he should prevail on estoppel. 
See, Brief of Appellant at 31 and 34. However, in this case where the Court allowed 
estoppel against URS, URS admittedly communicated with Mr. Eldredge both orally and 
in specific writing that the disputed service credit was granted to him under law, 
including providing him a letter stating that the 6.123 years of disputed service were 
eligible for service credit and a retirement estimate showing that he had obtained these 
years of service credit. Unlike Eldredge, in this case URS specifically denies ever 
making an incorrect statement to Mr. McLeod. 
Additionally, as a matter of law, the Hearing Officer could not make a finding that 
URS made an oral disputed statement to Mr. McLeod which it later repudiated because 
such a finding of fact would be based solely on inadmissible hearsay. In Utah, 
administrative hearings are allowed to accept otherwise non-admissible hearsay into 
evidence, but such hearsay evidence cannot be the sole basis for a finding of fact. The 
Utah Administrative Procedures Act in Utah Code Ann. §63G-4-206(l)(c) states, "The 
presiding officer may not exclude evidence solely because it is hearsay." However, Utah 
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Code Ann. §63G-4-208(3) limits the findings of fact which can be based on hearsay in 
stating, "A finding of fact that was contested may not be based solely on hearsay 
evidence unless that evidence is admissible under the Utah Rules of Evidence." 
Mr. McLeod desires to use his testimony of the disputed hearsay conversations 
between URS and Mr. McLeod in 1996 as the sole evidence to prove that URS made 
statements which it later repudiated.4 Because his testimony is the sole basis for proving 
URS made a statement which it later repudiated, no finding of fact can be made that URS 
made such a statement to Mr. McLeod. 
Mr. McLeod may respond to this problem as he did before the Hearing Officer 
that Mr. McLeod5s testimony of URS5 statements to him are merely trying to show his 
"state of mind55 when he retired, and thus the alleged statements are an exception to the 
hearsay rule. HR at 227-228. However, if such is the case, Mr. McLeod has then 
provided absolutely no evidence that a statement was made by URS which was later 
repudiated. 
Mr. McLeod also argued before the Hearing Officer that he was not offering his 
testimony of the conversations with URS to prove the truth of the matter asserted or to 
"show that what he was told was true55, and thus, these statements were not hearsay at all. 
HR at 257. If Mr. McLeod claims that his testimony is not necessarily true regarding the 
conversations with URS, he once again has no evidence for the substance of these 
4
 Mr. McLeod may also claim that URS made other written statements to him after his 
first retirement in 1996 which he claims were misleading. These alleged statements are 
not relevant to the matter because they did not affect his decision to retire the first time 
with URS in December 1996 which is his claimed "reliance55 on URS5 statements. 
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conversations and no finding of fact can be made in that regard. What it appears that Mr. 
McLeod fails to realize is that in order to prevail on a claim for estoppel, he has the 
burden to prove, under UTAH CODE ANN. §49-11-613(4), that he received a statement 
by URS which was later repudiated. Because his only evidence of such a statement was 
inadmissible hearsay, as a matter of law, no finding of fact could have been made based 
solely on Mr. McLeod5 s disputed testimony. As such, Mr. McLeod cannot prevail on the 
first crucial element of estoppel. 
ii. The Hearing Officer correctly determined that Mr. McLeod's reliance on 
the alleged URS statements was not reasonable. 
In addition to not being able to prove a statement made by URS, Mr. McLeod 
cannot meet the second element of estoppel, which is the reasonable action or inaction by 
the other party taken on the basis of the first party's statement, admission, act or failure to 
act. In the few cases where estoppel has been permitted against a government entity, they 
have each involved very specific reliance and grave injustice. For example, in Celebrity 
Club, Inc. v. Utah Liquor Control Comm % 602 P.2d 689 (Utah 1979), the Plaintiffs 
spent over $200,000 in renovating their club in direct reliance on the Liquor 
Commission's statements that they were in compliance with the law. In the Eldredge 
case, the Plaintiff quit his job and irrevocably retired based on the written letter and 
information the Retirement Office had sent to him. In this case, there is no such 
reasonable reliance. 
Hearing Officer Howe correctly determined in his Decision: 
Here, a major career decision rested upon the answers to [Mr. McLeod5s] 
telephone inquiries. Or, as he testified, it was a "life changing" decision. 
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[HT 58:19-22 and HT 131:6-8] He could have requested written 
confirmation from URS of the answers to the questions he asked. He could 
have made a written record of the persons he talked to and their position in 
URS. He could have had a professional review the statutes to verify what 
he claims he had been told. A greater in-depth inquiry was warranted in 
this major career decision than just two relatively brief telephone calls to 
unnamed persons at URS. 
HRat263. 
In addition, as noted by Hearing Officer Howe, the Legislature placed a statutory 
duty on Mr. McLeod to understand his rights and responsibilities concerning his 
retirement benefits. Utah Code Ann. § 49-11-613(1 )(a) states, "All members, retirees, 
participants, alternative payees, or covered individuals of a system, plan or program 
under this title shall acquaint themselves with their rights and obligations under this title." 
Therefore, "life changing" decisions based on brief telephone conversations with 
unknown persons at URS do not rise to the level of reasonable reliance to prevail on a 
claim for estoppel. 
In sum, Mr. McLeod failed to prove his claim for estoppel against the Board as a 
governmental entity. Mr. McLeod did not prove the "facts with specificity," nor 
"injustice of sufficient gravity" to invoke any exception to the general rule that estoppel 
may not be invoked against a governmental entity. Anderson v. Public Service Comm 'n, 
839 P.2d at 827. In addition, Mr. McLeod failed to prove the elements of estoppel 
because he could not prove URS made a statement, or that he reasonably relied on that 




Utah Code Ann. §49-11-504(9)(2007) unambiguous requires URS to calculate Mr. 
McLeod's retirement benefit, being a post-retired employee, based on two separate 
periods of service. 
In addition, Mr. McLeod's allegations regarding estoppel fail because he failed to 
properly marshal the evidence to challenge findings of fact, because he cannot prove facts 
with "certainty" to show that URS made a statement which it later repudiated, and 
because he failed to reasonably rely to his detriment on the alleged URS statements. As 
such, the Court should uphold the Hearing Officer's decision deny Mr. McLeod's request 
for relief in its entirety. 
DATED this H I day of July, 2010. 
B.Hans 
Howard, Phillips & Andersen 
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UTAH STATE RETIREMENT BOARD, 
Respondent. 
FINDINGS OF FACT, 
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 
AND ORDER 
File #: 07-16R 
A hearing was held on August 19, 2009, before the Adjudicative Hearing Officer on 
Petitioner's Request for Board Action. Kevin Mcleod ("Mr. McLeod") was represented by Mr. 
Reed M. Richards and Brandon R. Richards. The Utah State Retirement Board ("Board") was 
represented by Mr. David Hansen and Liza Eves of Howard, Phillips & Andersen. Based upon 
the testimony given, the evidence received, and the legal memoranda submitted, the Adjudicative 
Hearing Officer issued a memorandum decision on October 14, 2009, denying Petitioner's 
Request for Board Action. The Adjudicative Hearing Officer now makes the following Findings 
of Fact, Conclusions of Law and Order. 
FINDINGS OF FACT 
1. Mr. McLeod worked for Bountiful City and then for the Davis County Sherriff s Office 
accruing just over 20 years of service credit in the Public Safety Noncontributory 
Retirement System by November 1996. Hearing Transcript [hereinafter "HT"] 5:4-12. 
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2. In or about October 1996, Mr. McLeod was offered a position at Browning Arms. HT 
9:12-17,22:5-21. 
3. Mr. McLeod testified that he was concerned about his financial situation and determined 
to call the retirement department at the Utah State Retirement Office ("URS") with 
questions about his benefits. HT 12:2-9. 
4. URS has no record of a telephone call between Mr. McLeod and URS at any time during 
the year 1996. HT 156:16-157:20. However, Mr. McLeod claimed to have spoken with 
URS by telephone at least twice in October or November of 1996 regarding what would 
happen if he were to retire from Davis County, and then come back to work for Davis 
County at a later date. HT 13:3-20:2. 
5. Mr. McLeod failed to provide any verifiable evidence, such as a document or a recording, 
of the substance of any conversations with URS in 1996. The only evidence of the 
substance of these conversations is Mr. McLeod's testimony that a URS employee told 
him if he retired and later returned to work for Davis County that his retirement benefit 
would be cancelled upon his reemployment, and that when he retired the second time his 
benefit would be based on all his years of service credit combined and would be 
calculated as one period of service. 
6. URS disputed Mr. McLeod*s assertion that a URS employee told him that if he retired 
and was reemployed, his benefit for all of his years would be recalculated at his second 
retirement based on one period of service and using his new and significantly higher three 
highest years of salary. 
7. Mr. McLeod came away from those phone conversations with URS with the 
understanding that he could retire, draw retirement, return in two years to the same office, 
retire later a second time and have his retirement benefit calculated on the basis of one 
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period of employment. However, he has not met his burden of proof that he was actually 
told that. 
8. Mr. McLeod retired from his Davis County Sheriffs office position in December 1996 
and went to work for Browning Arms. HT 9:12-17,22:5-21. 
9. Between December 1996 and January 1999, URS paid Mr. McLeod his statutorily earned 
retirement benefits totaling approximately $50,000. HT: 85:8-15. 
10. Mr. McLeod returned to work for Davis County in January 1999, and pursuant to the 
retirement laws, had his retirement benefit cancelled while he remained employed. HT 
22:25-23:4; 86:7-15. 
11. In March of 2001, while still employed by Davis County, Mr. McLeod contacted URS 
and understood for the first time that his benefit would not be calculated the way he 
wished. HT 37:17-38:21. 
12. Mr. McLeod continued working for the Davis County Sheriffs Office until April 16, 
2007, when he voluntarily terminated his employment, retired, and began receiving his 
retirement benefits. HT 47:5-18;48:2-25. 
13. In April 2007, URS calculated Mr. McLeod's retirement benefit, pursuant to the relevant 
statute, based on two periods of service: 1) the service he performed prior to his first 
retirement, and 2) the service he performed between his first and second retirement. URS 
then added these calculations together to determine Mr. McLeod's retirement benefit. 
Mr. McLeod received full retirement service credit for each of his years he worked for 
public employers participating with URS. HT 170:17-23; 240: 15-22. 
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CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 
1. In April 2007, URS correctly followed the statutory scheme in U,C.A. §49-11-504(9) 
(2007) in calculating Mr. McLeod's retirement benefit which is based on two periods of service. 
That statute states: 
(9) Notwithstanding any other provision of this section, a retiree 
who has returned to work, accrued additional service credit, and 
again retires shall have the retiree's allowance recalculated using: 
(a) the formula in effect at the date of the retiree's original 
retirement for all service credit accrued prior to that date; and 
(b) the formula in effect at the date of the subsequent retirement for 
all service credit accrued between the first and subsequent 
retirement dates. 
2. U.C.A. §49-11-504(9) (2007) contains no ambiguity. The plain language of the statute 
supports URS' calculation of Mr. McLeod's benefits based on two periods of service. 
3. U.C.A. §49-11-613(1) (2007) requires that, "All members, retirees,... or covered 
individuals of a system .. . shall acquaint themselves with their rights and obligations under this 
title." Thus, the ultimate responsibility to understand retirement benefit rights, including 
retirement calculations lies with the member. 
4. Mr. McLeod cannot prevail on a claim for estoppel against URS. "As a general rule, 
estoppel may not be invoked against a governmental entity. In Utah, there is a limited exception 
to this general principle for 'unusual circumstances' 'where it is plain that the interests of justice 
so require.' This exception applies, however, only if 'the facts may be found with such certainty, 
and the injustice suffered is of sufficient gravity, to invoke the exception.'" Anderson v. Public 
Service Comm% 839 P.2d 822, 827 (Utah 1992)(citations omitted). 
5. The elements of equitable estoppel are: (1) a statement, admission, act or failure to act by 
one party inconsistent with a claim later asserted; (2) reasonable action or inaction by the other 
party taken on the basis of the first party's statement, admission, act or failure to act; and (3) 
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injury to the second party that would result from allowing the first party to contradict or 
repudiate such statement, admission, act or failure to act. Eldredge v. Utah State Retirement 
Board, 795 P.2d 671 (Utah App. 1990); Holland v. Career Service Review Board, 856 P.2d 678 ( 
Utah Ct.App. 1993). 
6, Mr. McLeod has not proved with "certainty" the representations of URS upon which he 
relies. Additionally, his reliance on those representations if they were made, was not reasonable 
under his circumstances of making a major career decision. 
ORDER 
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that Mr. McLeod's request for board action that his 
retirement benefit should be calculated on one period of service based on U.C.A. §49-11 -504(9) 
must be and is denied. In addition, Mr. McLeod 5s argument that URS should be estopped from 
calculating his benefit in two periods as statutorily required is also denied. 
BOARD RECONSIDERATION 
Within ten (10) days of a Board order, any party may file a written request for 
reconsideration stating the specific grounds upon which relief is requested as set forth in Utah 
Code Ann. §49-11-613. This filing for reconsideration is not a prerequisite for seeking judicial 
review of the order on review. The request for reconsideration shall be filed with the Board and 
one copy sent by mail to each person making the request. The Board chairman or executive 
director shall issue a written order granting or denying the request within twenty (20) days of 




If Petitioner is aggrieved with the final Board order, he may seek a judicial review within 
thirty (30) days after the date that the order constituting final Board action is issued. Petitioner 
shall name the Board and all other appropriate parties as respondents. The Utah Court of 
Appeals has jurisdiction to review all final Board actions resulting from formal proceedings. All 
petitioners shall follow the procedures established in Utah Code Ann.§ 63G-4-101 et. seq. 
/vi? 
DATED this ^ day of / > ^ ^ ^ ^ ^ ^ ^ 0 0 9 . 
Richard C. Howe 
Adjudicative Hearing Officer 
The foregoing Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law, and Order of Denial of the 
Adjudicative Hearing Officer is hereby adopted as the order of the Utah State Retirement Board. 
Dated this / 7 day of D ^ ^ J ^ ^ , P/j^j . 
UTAH STATE RETIREMENT BOARD 
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CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
I hereby certify that on this the _ 2 / 2 r day of "p-f.^- , 2009,1 mailed a true and 
correct copy of the above Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law and Order, postage pre-paid, 
to the following: 
Mr. Reed M. Richards 
Mr. Brandon R. Richards 
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